Do earned endowments lead to a weaker reciprocal response compared to windfall endowments? Over the past two decades experimental economics research that emerged provided scientific evidence that people care not only about their own material payoffs but also about fairness, equity, and reciprocity. In particular, a lot of attention has been devoted to reciprocity (Camerer, 2003; Cox, 2013). In a vast majority of experiments documenting existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed with some start up money. This endowment serves as "starting capital" from which subjects draw when making decisions of interest to the experimenter. In some situations such windfall endowments might create a so-called "house money effect". Having subjects earn money in another task prior to making decisions produced more self-serving behavior in subjects (Cherry, Kroll and Shogren, 2005; Harrison, 2007; Hoffman, McCabe, Schachat, and Smith, 2002; Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Thaler and Johnson, 1990 ). Since reciprocation is costly, having to earn an endowment might increase the perceived cost of reciprocation and diminish its frequency and/or size. It is therefore possible that the existing literature overestimates the extent of reciprocal behavior. The current study experimentally tests this conjecture.
evidence that people care not only about their own material payoffs but also that they are willing to forego significant income in order to influence the payoffs of others. Particularly a lot of attention has been devoted to reciprocity -a tendency to react to the kind actions of others with kind responses and to the hostile actions of others with retaliation. 1 In a vast majority of laboratory experiments documenting the existence of reciprocity subjects are endowed with start up money. This endowment serves as starting capital from which subjects draw when making decisions of interest to the experimenter, potentially creating a "house money effect." The current paper explores the implications of endowing subjects with windfall gains for the observed reciprocal behavior. In particular, we are interested whether people are less likely to negatively reciprocate if earned money is in stake as opposed to when they use "house money."
Since money is fungible, why should the source of endowment matter? According to mental accounting (Thaler, 1990 ) different sources of income might lead to different ways of spending. If costs of obtaining an endowment vary, people might place such endowments in different mental accounts, which might in turn lead to different decisions. In particular, having to earn an endowment might increase the perceived cost of reciprocation and thus diminish its frequency and/or extent. Such conjecture is consistent with the results of previous studies, which show that having subjects earn money in another task prior to making decisions produced a more self-serving behavior (for example, Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren; 2002). Since reciprocation is costly, it is possible that the experiments in which subjects use house money to pay for punishment overestimate the extent of reciprocal behavior. Previous research shows that generosity observed in the laboratory conditions is often greater than one would observe in the field and that this might be partly due to the house money effect (Carlsson, He, and Martinsson, 2013) . However, the existing literature does not allow us to conclude whether reciprocity observed in laboratory conditions is subject to the house money effect.
There are two reasons why the source of endowment might matter for reciprocity. The first is that if money used to pay for punishment is earned as opposed to received from the experimenter, one might perceive the punishment to be more costly due to this money being in a different mental account. The second reason is related to property rights. If another person's decision decreased a decision-maker's endowment and the endowment consisted of earned money rather than house money, he might consider it to be a stronger violation of property rights, which in turn can trigger stronger punishment.
1 For example Ostrom et al. (1992) , Fehr and Gächter (2000) , Ostrom and Walker (2005) ; see also Camerer (2003) , Cox (2013) for surveys and Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) , Falk and Fischbacher (2006) , Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) and Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj (2008) for theoretical approaches to modeling reciprocity. Also, while not a model of reciprocity per se, inequityaversion theory (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999 ) is sometimes used to explain behavior of fair-minded people who want to achieve more equitable final outcomes.
To tackle the issue of the house money effect we have designed an experiment in which we test whether the source of endowment influences punishment behavior. 2 Our subjects interact in a two-player Taking game in which the First Mover (FM) decides whether or not to take a sum of money from the Second Mover's (SM) endowment. If the FM does not take money, the game ends and both players keep their initial endowments. If the FM takes money from the SM, the SM can punish him in return. Within this game we implement three treatments to separate the above-described reasons behind (possibly) different punishment behavior. In the first treatment, the SM's endowment consists entirely of house money. Whatever is left after the FM's decision, the SM can use to purchase punishment. In the second and third treatment, the SM's endowment consists of funds earned in a real-effort task as well as of house money. In one case, the FM takes the house money part of the endowment and the SM can punish using his earned money whereas in the other case the FM takes the earned part and the SM can punish him using house money.
Our study builds on earlier work of three types: research on negative reciprocity, the house money effect and mental accounting. We discuss each of them in some detail in relation to our research question.
Reciprocity plays an important role in labor relationships as it has a potential to increase efficiency through enforcement of incomplete contracts (Fehr, Gächter, Kirchsteiger, 1997) . Firms value loyal workers who are committed to the goals of the firm. Loyalty means that workers take into account the interests of their employers and if employers also take into account the interests of their employees, a positive valuation of the employer's payoff can be created. The notion of loyalty therefore naturally follows from the notion of reciprocity. In the same vein, workers have many opportunities to take advantage of employers. Poor treatment of workers could lead to negatively reciprocal behavior such as low effort or even sabotage. Firms (and their managers) are well aware of potential repercussions from diminished morale and loyalty and try to circumvent them by implementing sensible strategies, such as not lowering wages following a demand shock, which is evidenced by downward wage rigidity (Bewley, 1999) . A gift-exchange game has been the workhorse used to study various aspects of labor market relationships and incomplete contracts (see Charness and Kuhn, 2011 for a nice survey). While there exist some experiments (both lab and field) that involve a real-effort task instead of inducing costs of effort (e.g., Gneezy and List, 2006; Kube, Maréchal and Puppe, 2012) as in the most stylized version of the game and thus circumvent the potential house money effect, we are unaware of any studies that would compare the behavior in a giftexchange game with house money versus earned endowments.
Another strand of literature on (negative) reciprocity deals with punishment (or sanctions) and enforcement of social norms. In a seminal paper, Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992) show that introducing costly punishment in a common pool resource game can overcome strong self-interest of individual appropriators and lead to a mutually efficient outcome. Fehr and Gächter (2000) Experimental literature thus provides ample evidence for reciprocity under controlled laboratory conditions. As mentioned earlier, in most of these experiments participants are endowed with start up funds from the experimenter that might be treated as a windfall gain, thereby creating a house money effect, meaning that people might spend or invest such money more recklessly than they would their own. The house money effect was first evidenced by Thaler and Johnson (1990) in a lottery choice experiment in which losses were subtracted from subjects' initial endowments. Several studies point out that the observed behavior might differ if subjects receive windfall endowments as opposed to when these endowments are earned ( Cox, Servátka, Vadovič (2013) found that earning endowments significantly affected giving and taking behavior by first movers but had insignificant effect on second movers' reciprocal responses. Clark (2002) finds no effect of house money in the voluntary contributions mechanism public goods game using unconditional nonparametric methods. Harrison (2007) , however, shows that the same data display a significant effect when analyzing responses at the individual level and accounting for the error structure of the panel data. Finally, Carlsson, He, and Martinsson (2013) used a 2x2 design combining laboratory and field experiments to examine the impact of windfall money on generosity. In both environments they found that subjects donate more when the endowment is a windfall.
It therefore appears that if the endowments are earned, subjects act in a more selfregarding manner. What causes such change in behavior? Mental accounting sheds some light on the issue. According to the principle of fungibility (Thaler, 1990) all money is the same regardless of its origin or intended use. However, people often treat money differently depending on its source and separate their funds into mental accounts based on subjective criteria. Mental accounting is a cognitive process by which people keep track of the flow of their money and keep their spending under control. Thaler distinguished among three components of mental accounting. The first one captures how outcomes are perceived and experienced, and how decisions are made and subsequently evaluated. The second component involves an assignment of activities to specific accounts. Both the sources and uses of funds are labeled in real as well as in mental accounting systems. The third component of mental accounting concerns the frequency with which accounts are evaluated. Thus according to mental accounting, money in one mental account is not a perfect substitute for money in another account and it might lead to violations of normative economic principle of fungibility. Different sources of experimental endowment might therefore have implications on subject behavior.
Experimental Design and Procedures
The purpose of this experiment is to test whether punishment behavior is subject to the house money effect. In particular, receiving an endowment from the experimenter might impact the size and/or frequency of punishment. The existing experimental economics literature describes (at least) three methods of controlling for the house money effect. The first one was implemented by Clark (2002) who had his subjects bring their own money to the experiment. While this is certainly a possibility, most experimental economics laboratories, including ours, advertise that subjects will on average earn a significant amount of cash from participation. Since in our design, which is described below, it is possible to suffer a loss, such method could impact the reputation and credibility of the laboratory and discourage future participation.
A second method, used by Cardenas, De Roux, Jaramillo and Martinez (2013), involves giving money to subjects in advance and requires them to bring it to the experiment. Such method enables the participants to "bond" with money as after a while of having it in possession they might start considering it their own. This method, however, bears a risk that subjects will not show up for the experiment or they will not bring the money with them.
A third method involves creating property right entitlements towards the initial endowments by having subjects earn them in a real-effort task as in Hoffman, and Spitzer (1985) and Cherry et al. (2002) . Such procedure serves as an analogue to everyday life where people exchange their time and effort for monetary payments. While it is possible that the three methods lead to different levels of entitlement, we felt that the third method was quite natural while also being the most practical one and decided to implement it in our experiment.
In our setup, there are two reasons why the source of endowment might matter. The first reason is that if a person had to earn money he uses for punishment, as opposed to receiving it from the experimenter, he might perceive the punishment to be more costly due to this money being in a different mental account and therefore he will punish less. The second reason is that if earned money as opposed to house money is taken from a person, he might consider it to be a stronger violation of his property rights, which in turn can trigger a stronger response.
In order to separate these two effects, we have introduced a Taking game played by two players, the First Mover and the Second Mover. The experiment consists of three treatments: HOUSE MONEY, EARNED MONEY (used) for PUNISHMENT, and EARNED MONEY TAKEN, implemented in an across-subjects design. The treatments differ in the source of endowment, which is i) used for punishing and ii) taken by the other player.
In the HOUSE MONEY treatment the FM receives $10 and the SM receives $18 from the experimenter as initial endowments. There is no real effort task performed by SMs. Both movers proceed to playing the Taking game, which is described below.
In the second and third treatment, the SM's endowment consists of funds earned in a real-effort task as well as of house money. In the EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT treatment the FM as well as the SM are endowed with $10. The SM performs a real effort task, in which he can earn $8. The real effort task consists of cutting posters inviting students to participate in economics experiments in our laboratory. This particular task does not require any specific skills and we decided to use it because represents a meaningful activity as subjects could later see the posters on notice boards around the university campus. We asked the SMs to neatly cut the bottom part of 20 posters to create stubs that included a web page link of the database where interested students could register for experiments. For accomplishing the task, each SM earned $8. After finishing the task, the Taking game proceeds.
The EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatment differs from the EARNED MONEY used for PUNISHMENT in that in the earlier, the FM takes the house money part of the endowment and the SM can punish using his earned money whereas in the latter the FM takes the earned part and the SM can punish using the house money. Thus, in the EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatment, the FM is endowed with $10 and the SM with $8.
On the top of that, the SM can earn additional $10 in the real effort task.
The Taking game that is played in all three treatments is presented in Figure 1 . In Stage 1 of the game the FM has the option to Take or Not Take $10 from the SM. If the FM does Not Take $10, this yields the FM a payoff of $10 and SM a payoff of $18. If the FM Takes $10 from the SM, the game proceeds with Stage 2, where the SM decides whether to punish the FM. Decreasing the FM's payoff by $4 costs the SM $1. The SM can use up to $4 from his own endowment to decrease the FM's payoff up to $16. If the SM does not wish to punish the FM, he can do so by choosing the "decrease by $0" option.
Figure 1. Taking Game
For our design it is crucial that subjects recognize that the SM's endowment consists of two parts -one that could be taken by the FM and the other that can be used to purchase punishment. In order to highlight this we deliberately chose different amounts to represent these two parts: in all treatments $10 can be taken and $8 is used for punishment. What differs is the source. The instructions were framed in a way to ensure that subjects understand which part of their total endowment is being taken and which is used for punishing. This might aid creating two separate mental accounts. The relevant part of the instructions is presented below. Our design allows us to identify the reasons why the source of endowment might matter for the frequency and/or extent of punishment. We test the following two hypotheses:
Starting Balance Each person in Group
Hypothesis 1: Punishment in the HOUSE MONEY treatment will be greater than in the EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT treatment.
Hypothesis 2: Punishment in the EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatment will be greater than in the HOUSE MONEY treatment.
A total of 224 subjects participated in the experiment. The experimental sessions were conducted in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) at the University of Canterbury. Subjects were recruited using the online database system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . Each subject only participated in a single session of the study. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
The number of subjects in a session varied from twenty to thirty-six. All sessions were run under a single-blind social distance protocol. On average, a session lasted 60 minutes and subjects earned on average 16.34 NZD per session. 5 Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned into Group A (FMs) and Group B (SMs) by drawing a letter (A or B) from a manila envelope and asked to sit in an appropriate cubicle. At the beginning of the experiment instructions (provided in the Appendix) were handed out, as well as projected onto a screen. In the EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT and EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatment, Task 1 instructions were first handed out to both Group A and Group B and read aloud.
Group B persons were then given scissors and 20 NZEEL posters and asked to cut them along the perforated lines. Once all Group B subjects completed the task, the posters and scissors were collected. Task 2 instructions were handed out, projected on the screen and read aloud to ensure common knowledge of the fact that Group B persons had to earn a part of their starting balance. 6 Any questions arising were answered in private. All subjects had to answer control questions and had to get all answers right before they could proceed to the decision making part of the experiment, which was run using the strategy method (Selten, 1967; Brandts and Charness, 2011) . Afterwards, subjects entered their decisions, and upon the completion of the experiment, they were asked to complete a questionnaire. Subjects were then called one by one to receive their payment in private in the payment room in the back of the laboratory. 
Figure 2. FMs' Behavior
From Figure 2 it appears that the FMs respected the property rights of the SMs by taking less often if the part of the SM's endowment they could lay their hands on was earned. We test whether this is indeed the case by comparing behavior in both treatments where FMs could take the windfall part of the endowment, i.e., HOUSE MONEY and EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT, against the EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatment. The one-sided Fisher's exact tests reported in the second and third rows of Table 1 reveal that the frequency of taking behavior in EARNED MONEY TAKEN is statistically significantly higher than in HOUSE MONEY (p=0.076) but not different from EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT (p=0.405).
Since in HOUSE MONEY and EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT the FMs could take the windfall part of the endowment, we expect there will be no statistically significant difference, which is confirmed by the result of the Fishers' test reported in the first row of Table 1 (p=0.326 two-sided). FMs' decisions thus provides mild support for the fact that subjects respected property rights created by earning money through exerting effort. Their decisions also provide a useful manipulation check. In particular, two out of three predictions regarding the FMs' behavior that were based on the source of money being taken were born out in the data (and the third prediction had the right "direction"). Based on these results it appears that FMs did not consider the earned and windfall part of SMs' endowments to be completely fungible. 
SMs' Behavior
SMs' behavior is summarized in Table 2 . The first column reports the number and frequency of SMs who decided to punish their paired FM for taking $10 from them. Recall that we used the strategy method and therefore have an observation on all SMs who participated in the experiment. To our surprise, the highest frequency of punishment occurred in the EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT treatment where 51.2% SMs spent on average $1.76 on punishment, followed by the EARNED MONEY TAKEN (46% and $1.38) and the HOUSE MONEY (24.5% and $0.77) treatments. The last column of Table 2 presents the consequences of punishment for the FMs' earnings. The distribution of punishment decisions across the three treatments is presented in Figure 3 . The largest difference in SMs behavior appears to be in the $0 and $4 spent on punishment categories. While in the HOUSE MONEY about 76.5% of SMs did not punish at all, in EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT and EARNED MONEY TAKEN it was 48.8% and 54.1%, respectively. On the other hand, in EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT 34.2% punished the maximum amount, in EARNED MONEY TAKEN it was only 18.9% and in HOUSE MONEY only 11.8%.
Figure 3. Distribution of SMs' Punishment Behavior
Out Hypothesis 1 states that punishment in the HOUSE MONEY treatment will be greater than in the EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT treatment. This is based on a conjecture that if money used to pay for punishment is earned as opposed to received from the experimenter, one might perceive the punishment to be more costly due to this money being in a different mental account. Result 1 summarizes our finding.
Result 1:
The frequency and extent of punishment is higher in the EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT treatment than in the HOUSE MONEY treatment.
Support for Result 1:
As can be seen from Table 2 , there is more punishment in EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT than in HOUSE MONEY. The two-sided Fisher's exact test, reported in the first row of Table 3 , supports this observation by detecting that the frequency of punishing behavior is statistically significantly higher (p-value = 0.018) in EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT than in HOUSE MONEY. The Mann-Whitney test reported in the same row, detects statistically significant difference between the two treatments in terms of the extent of punishment (p-value = 0.012), thus leading to the rejection of Hypothesis 1. □ In light of our original conjecture that earning money increases the cost of punishment, the fact that SMs' punished more with their earned money is somewhat surprising. While the increase in punishment does not necessarily indicate that the SMs considered the two parts of their endowment to be fungible, it suggests that (negative) reciprocity and property rights are inherently related. In Section 4 we provide an ex-post interpretation of our results from the perspective of inequity aversion. Hypothesis 2 states that punishment in the EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatment will be greater than in the HOUSE MONEY treatment. We conjectured that since in the EARNED MONEY treatment FMs (could) take the earned part of the SMs' endowment, SMs might consider it a stronger violation of their property rights, which could lead to stronger punishment.
Result 2
The frequency and extent of punishment is higher in the EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatment than in the HOUSE MONEY treatment.
Support for Result 2:
The Fisher's exact test, reported in the second row of Table 3 reveals that the frequency of punishment in EARNED MONEY TAKEN is statistically significantly higher than in the HOUSE MONEY (p-value = 0.08). The corresponding Mann-Whitney test detects that the extent of punishment was also higher (p-value = 0.073), thus providing support for Hypothesis 2. □ Our experimental design also allows for comparison of punishment behavior in the EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT treatment with that in the EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatment. By combining Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 together, we expected to see more punishment in EARNED MONEY TAKEN than in EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT.
Result 3:
There is no statistical difference in punishment between the EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT treatment and the EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatment.
Support for Result 3:
The Fisher's exact test reported in the third row of Table 3 detects no difference in the frequency of SMs' punishing behavior between these two treatments. The corresponding Mann-Whitney detects no difference in the extent of punishment (p-value = 0.354). □
The fact that SMs punished more in both EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT and EARNED MONEY TAKEN treatments than in HOUSE MONEY tells us that property right entitlements might lead to a stronger negatively reciprocal response. But do subjects make a distinction between house money and money that was earned in the real effort task? To get that at this issue, in EARNED MONEY TAKEN, which was the last treatment we ran, we added two questions about subjects' perception about the source of SMs' endowment into the post-experiment (demographics) questionnaire. In particular, we asked subjects the following questions. According to answers provided in the questionnaire, 31 out of 37 (83.8%) FMs and 32 out of 37 (86.5%) SMs perceived the money taken as earned. This suggests that the remaining 6 FMs and 5 SMs were either confused or considered the two parts of the initial endowment to be fungible. 7 While this questionnaire data does not prove that subjects placed their house money and earned money in two different mental accounts which would influence their decisions in the experiment, it serves as a manipulation check showing that they recognized different sources of SMs' endowments.
Ex-Post Interpretation of Data Based on Inequity Aversion
An alternative explanation of results from our experiment is provided by inequity aversion. A few outcome-based models of other-regarding preferences posit that people dislike unequal payoffs and may lower their material payoffs to lessen the disparity. Bolton (1991) suggests that people only care about relative payoffs when they are at a relative disadvantage while Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that people have a symmetric dislike for inequity. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) develop the notion of selfcentered inequality aversion, in which one dislikes all inequality but cares more about this when at a relative payoff disadvantage. Inequity aversion means that people resist inequitable outcomes; i.e. they are willing to give up some material payoff to move in the direction of more equitable. According to Fehr and Schmidt inequity model, subjects who dislike inequitable outcomes experience inequity if they are worse off in material terms than the other players in the experiment. However, they also feel inequity when they are better off.
In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model the utility function for player i is defined as follows: Ui = xi -αi max {xj -xi, 0} -βi max{xi -xj, 0}, where i≠j.
In our experiment, it is not possible for a SM to get a higher payoff than the FM, so we take into consideration only the advantageous part of the utility function: Ui = xiαi max {xj -xi, 0}. Based on this specification, we calculate the cut-off alpha necessary for subjects to display punishing behavior to be 1/3. By having SMs earn a part of their endowment, their alpha increased, meaning they started to care more about being in a disadvantageous position. This lead to more subjects having α > 1/3 in EARNED MONEY for PUNISHMENT and EARNED MONEY TAKEN than in HOUSE MONEY, which in turn lead to more punishment in these two treatments.
Discussion
This paper experimentally investigates the extent of reciprocal reaction to unkind behavior when a part of the initial endowment is being earned by performing a real effort task. We compare subjects' behavior in three treatments embedded that differ in the source of endowment being taken by another player and/or used for punishment. The treatments are nested in a Taking game in which the FM has an opportunity to take $10 from the SM for which the SM can punish him. Based on mental accounting (Thaler, 1990) we conjecture that subjects place their earned money and house money in two different mental accounts and as a result will punish less using their earned money because it increases the costs of punishment. Similarly, if it is earned money that is taken from them, we conjecture that they will punish more because of the violation of their property rights which are stronger for the account that stores earned funds. While we find support for the latter conjecture, we also find that subjects actually punish more with their earned money than with house money, suggesting that earning a part of their endowment made them more inequality averse. While we provide auxiliary evidence that subjects recognized the difference between earned money and house money, this does not necessarily mean that they were using different mental accounts for the two. This exploration is left for future research.
